TENDER OFFERORS: ENTER THE CONTROL
BATTLE AT YOUR OWN RISK

To analyze effectively the evolution of the cash tender offer as a mechanism for acquiring corporate control, this
Comment first examines the historical need for recognition
of cash tender offer. The authorthen discusses regulationof
cash tender offers through section 14(e) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934 and tracesjudicial attempts to delineate
the scope of section 14(e). Finally,the Comment examines the
Supreme Court's latest pronouncement concerningthe scope
and properjudicial interpretationof section 14(e).
The tender offer is an established mechanism utilized by aggressor
corporations to expand through the acquisition of other corporations. Cash tender offers were not subject to regulation under the
federal securities laws prior to 1968. In an effort to preserve the
integrity of the cash tender offer as a means of corporate acquisition,
Congress enacted section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (1934 Act).' Section 14(e) is an antifraud provision specifically
directed toward regulating cash tender offers by ensuring fair and
adequate disclosure. Section 14(e) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of
a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitations of
security holders
in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request
2
or invitation.
In 1977, the Supreme Court rendered its definitive interpretation
of section 14(e) in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries,Inc.3 by holding
that a tender offeror when suing in its capacity as a takeover bidder
does not have standing to sue for damages under the Williams Act.
The Supreme Court's interpretation differed dramatically from the
lower federal court's interpretation of section 14(e). After exploring
the history and the regulation of cash tender offers, the meaning of
these decisions is examined.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
2. Id.
3. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
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THE HISTORY OF TENDER OFFER LEGISLATION

The Need for Regulation of Tender Offers
As a means of acquiring control of a corporation, the cash tender
offer 4 became popular in the 1960's when it was one of three major
avenues to corporate acquisition available to an outside corporation.
The other two avenues are the public exchange offer and the proxy
fight.5 In deciding which avenue to pursue, tactical considerations

are paramount because these avenues are occasionally used against
each other.6 At the time cash tender offers and public exchange offers
were employed most often, proxy fights were rarely utilized.
Although cash tender offers were free from regulation before 1968,
proxy contests and public exchange offers were-and still are-sub-

ject to extensive federal regulation.7 Individuals choosing the proxy
contest are required to file advance copies of the proxy statement,
which includes disclosure of substantial information on the corporation soliciting proxy votes. A private cause of action is available to
maintain the integrity of takeover attempts through fair and adequate disclosure. The tender offeror is liable to the target company's
shareholders for use of deceptive or false information in a proxy
solicitation for securities. 8 Use of the public exchange offer requires
4. A cash tender offer is defined as
[a] public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of
persons to purchase during a fixed period of time all or a portion of a
class or classes of securities of a publicly held corporation at a specified
price or upon specified terms for cash and/or securities.
Aranow & Einhorn, Essential Ingredients of the Cash Tender Invitation, 27
Bus. LAW. 415, 415 (1972).
5. SEC rule lOb-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1977), defines "exchange offer" to
"include a tender offer for, or request or invitation for tenders of, any security in
exchange for any consideration other than for cash." The terms "proxy fight"
and "proxy" are not defined in the 1934 Act. The meaning of these terms is
implied from the terms of § 14(a) of the 1934 Act, which regulates "proxies."
6. For example, in a contest between General Host Corp. and Greyhound
Lines, Inc. for control of Armour & Co., General Host made an exchange offer
of a package of securities consisting of a $60 subordinated debenture and one
and one-half warrants to purchase General Host common stock at $45 per share.
Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1969, at 21, col. 1. Greyhound countered by making a cash
tender offer of $65 per Armour share, increased it to $70, and then to $72. Id.,
Feb. 11, 1969, at 3, col. 2. The control contest culminated in Armour suing for an
injunction of the exchange of securities offered by General Host. Armour & Co.
v. General Host Corp., 296 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Armour was denied its
request for an injunction because there was no evidence that General Host had
violated any securities laws.
7. Proxy fights are regulated by § 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976),
and by SEC rules promulgated pursuant thereto, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 to -103
(1977). Public exchange offers are regulated by the registration requirements of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1976).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (1977). See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375 (1970); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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registration of the security offered and advance filing of a prospectus
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which must
also be presented to every target shareholder receiving the exchange
offer. False or misleading information in the prospectus also engen-

ders a private cause of action.9
Aggressive corporations increasingly turned to the unregulated
cash tender offer, which allowed the corporation to set self-serving
terms for its offer. 10 The absence of regulation of cash tender offers
forced courts reviewing the challenged takeovers to rely on the general antifraud provisions" and the disparate rules and practices of
the stock exchanges. 12 Another factor that encouraged proliferation
of cash tender offers by aggressive corporations was the
slight expen13
diture involved in conducting the cash tender offer.
In 1968, Congress became alarmed at the dramatic growth of cash
tender offers' 4 due to the gap in federal regulations between cash
tender offers and extensively regulated proxy fights and public ex15
change offers. This gap was closed by passage of the Williams Act,
which imposed disclosure requirements upon parties making cash
tender offers.' 6 The Williams Act was intended to put cash tender
offers on equal footing with other methods of corporate acquisition"
and covered private as well as on-the-market acquisitions.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976).
10. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1967).

11. Reliance upon general antifraud provisions occurred most notably
through implication or extrapolation of rule lOb-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
12. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1967).
13. 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967). The primary cost of a cash tender offer is the
premium paid over the market price of the securities sought to be acquired. See,
e.g., Cohen, Tender Offers and Takeover Bids, 23 Bus. LAW. 611 (1968); Fleischer & Mundheim, CorporateAcquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
317 (1967); Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, HARV. Bus. REV.,
March-April, 1967, at 135.
14. This congressional alarm was compounded by the uncertain evolution of
rule lOb-5 as applied by the courts to cash tender offer litigation. The leading

articles on cash tender offers and rule lob-5 illustrating this point are: Cohen, A
Note on Takeover Bids and CorporatePurchasesof Stock, 22 Bus. LAW. 149
(1966); Cohen, Tender Offers and Takeover Bids, 23 Bus. LAw. 611 (1968); Fleischer & Mundheim, CorporateAcquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
317 (1967); Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, HA~v. Bus. REV.,
March-April, 1967, at 135.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976).
16. Id. § 78n(d)(e).
17. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967). See, e.g., Fleischer & Mundheim, CorporateAcquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 318-22
(1967).

Originally, Senator Williams, the sponsor of the Williams Act, was
primarily concerned with protecting incumbent corporate management from corporate raiders.'" However, the Senator was subsequently persuaded that tender offers could in fact serve a very useful
purpose by eliminating inefficient and inept management. 19 Therefore, references to corporate raiders were omitted from his bill, making it neutral by neither encouraging nor discouraging cash tender
offers. 20 The main purpose of the bill was to protect investors by

ensuring the conveyance of extensive and accurate information
about the takeover attempt to public shareholders 21 rather than to
"penalize . . . the legitimate businessman with legitimate methods
and legitmate goals. '22 The pervasive theme of the bill was disclosure, 23 requiring the dissemination of "material facts concerning the
identity, background and plans of the person or group making a
tender offer."'24 The section of the bill specifically directed at regulating cash tender offers was section 14(e).
The Evolution of Section 14(e) in the Courts
The Williams Act created new questions concerning civil liability
under the securities laws. Section 14(e)-the antifraud provision of
the Williams Act-provides a new basis of recovery for those involved in a tender offer battle. The courts have been quite liberal in
delineating the intended beneficiaries of section 14(e) while remaining cognizant of the strict standing requirements of related antifraud
provisions such as rule 10b-5. 25 It has been urged that to have stand18. 111 CONG. REc. 28,258 (1965) (statement of Sen. Williams). Senator Williams introduced this version by sympathetically referring to "proud old
companies rendered to corporate shells after white-collar pirates have seized
control." Id. at 28,257.
19. 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
20. Id. See generally Griffin & Tucker, The Williams Act, Public Law 90.
439-GrowingPains?SomeInterpretationswith Respect to the Williams Act, 16
How. L.J. 654 (1971); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HAnv. L. Rmv. 377, 381-89
(1969).
22. 111 CONG. REc. 28,260 (1965) (statement of Sen. Williams).
23. Id. This need for disclosure was also evidenced in the title of the bill:
Full Disclosure of CorporateEquity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover
Bids. Reinforcement is found in the ban of misleading information relating to
proxy solicitations. See note 7 supra. In a sense, these provisions, designed
to protect specific evils Congress thought existed in tender offer practices,
constituted a code of "fair play." Thus, the integrity of the tender offer as a
mechanism of corporation acquisition was insured and preserved.
24. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). There are a number of cases denying standing
under rule 10b-5. E.g., Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. D. Kaltman & Co., 283 F.
Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Pacific Ins. Co. v. Blot, 267 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y.
1967). Cf. Moore v. Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ohio 1967)
(granting standing under rule lOb-5). The requirements for a competing tender
offeror to gain standing were not clear prior to the Williams Act. See, e.g.,
Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert
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ing in the federal courts there must be "a substantial claim founded
'directly' upon federal law."2 6 Under section 14(e), the federally protected interest is in preserving the integrity of the tender offer as a
mechanism of corporate acquisition by ensuring fair and adequate
disclosure through the regulation of takeover attempts.
27
Electronic Specialty Co. v. InternationalControls Corp. was the
threshold case presenting the issue of standing under section 14(e). In
this case, the plaintiff target company was given standing to sue the
defendant tender offeror. The defendant had allegedly made misleading statements about its future plans for the target corporation.
The Second Circuit determined that the purpose of section 14(e) is
to ensure that full and accurate disclosures are made by the tender
offeror and the target company management to the target company
shareholders. 28 The court reasoned that liberal standing requirements were mandated by the express legislative intent. 29 The court
declared that section 14(e) could properly be invoked as a means of
protecting their separate interests by both the target company and
the non-tendering shareholder in a suit for injunctive relief. The
court urged district courts to be prompt in issuing injunctive relief in
these circumstances but cautioned them to be wary of sham suits
instituted for the purposes of harassing, delaying, or even defeating
legitimate tender offers.30 This case set an important precedent for
according standing under section 14(e) but left open the question of
who is entitled to damages and on what grounds.
This question was at issue in Neuman v. ElectronicSpecialty Co.31
denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970) (no standing for action against the target company).
Standing under rule lOb-5 is addressed in Comment, 10b-5 Standing Under
Birnbaum: The Case of the Missing Remedy, 24

26.

HASTINGS

L.J. 1007 (1973).

ishkin, The Federal Questionin the DistrictCourts, 53 COLUM. L. REV.
157, 168 (1953). The decisive cases on standing rendered by the United States
Supreme Court ask the question whether plaintiff had "a personal stake in the
outcome" of the controversy. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
27. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
28. Id. at 945.
29. Id. at 946.
30. Id. The very nature of tender offeirs demands that immediate relief be
available. The Second Circuit adhered to the ElectronicSpecialty precedent in
Butler Aviation Int'l v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir.
1970). In Butler, the court granted standing to the target company to sue the
tender offeror for misleading information in the tender offeror's annual report.
The annual report was required to be submitted to the target company under §
14(e)'s disclosure requirements.
31. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,591 (N.D. Ill.
1969).

The target company had presented misleading statements to its
shareholders regarding the tender offer. The court granted these
shareholders standing to sue the target company for damages because they had relied on the target company's misleading statements
32
in their decision not to tender their shares to the tender offeror.
In Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 33 standing to sue for

damages under section 14(e) was granted to a shareholder of the
tender offeror on the ground that the plaintiff's shares in the defendant corporation had been devalued by approximately 33.27% because of the defendant's acquisition of three banks through an exchange tender offer.34 The court noted that although section 14(e) did
not expressly provide for a private cause of action, such a cause of
action could reasonably be implied from section 14(e) by analogy to
the private cause of action implied from rule 10b-5. 35 The defendant
tender offeror urged that the plaintiff lacked standing because she
was not a "purchaser or seller" at the time of the bank merger.36 The
court disposed of the defendant's contention by surveying cases
granting standing under section 14(e)37 and by noting that the

congressional purpose behind the section was protection of the public investor from deceptive tactics in a tender offer. Using these cases
32. Id. at 98,705-06.
33. 336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971).
34. The court held exchange tender offers to be within § 14(e)'s antifraud
provisions. Id. at 907.
35. Id. at 913-14.
36. Id. at 912. Rule lob-5 provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). In construing this rule, the courts have uniformly
held that any plaintiff suing thereunder has no standing unless he expressly
meets the "purchaser-seller" limitation imposed by rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952) (the so-called Birnbaum doctrine established the purchaser-seller requirements for standing under rule lOb-5). This requirement has come under
attack in the courts and by the commentators. E.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d
792, 800 (5th Cir. 1970); Comment, The Purchaser-SellerRequirement of Rule
lOb-5 Reevaluated, 44 U. COLO. L. REv. 151 (1972).
37. The cases surveyed were Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419
F.2d 787 (2dCir. 1969)(standing granted to the tender offeror); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969) (standing
granted to the target company and to a non-tendering shareholder); Fabrikant
v. Jacobellis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,686
(E.D.N.Y. 1970) (standing granted to the target company and to a non-tendering
shareholder); Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
92,591 (N.D. fIl. 1969) (standing granted to a nontendering shareholder).
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and the congressional purpose behind section 14(e) as a foundation,
the court concluded that the plaintiff should have standing as a party
38
obviously within the class designated for protection by Congress.
In granting standing to the plaintiff shareholder, the Dyer court
clearly adhered to the theory that in the context of tender offers,
section 14(e) was essentially rule 10b-5 without the purchaser-seller
limitation. This theory is in accord with the congressional intent to
close the gap in tender offer regulations by passing the Williams
Act. 9
The case of H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co. 40 expanded
standing under section 14(e) to include specifically the tender offeror
itself. The plaintiff tender offeror sued the target company over
allegedly misleading statements concerning the plaintiff made by the
target company to its own shareholders. These misleading statements
caused the shareholders to refrain from tendering to the plaintiff,
thereby effectively defeating its tender offer. The court concluded
that an award of damages was warranted under section 14(e) in light
of the legislative intent to protect shareholders. 41 Additionally, the
court determined that Congress intended the courts to take a neutral
stance in construing and enforcing the Williams Act, and therefore
the target was not to be favored over the contestants. 42 Although the
plaintiff failed to sue immediately after discovering the acts sought
to be enjoined, the court stated that offenses in a tender offer battle
do not usually come to light until the conclusion of the contest and
that the suit thus was timely. Of paramount importance in this case is
the court's rejection of the argument that the shareholders of the
target company would be injured by an award of damages against the
38. 336 F. Supp. at 914.

39. Statutory symmetry appears to be a basis for the liberalization of stand-

ing under § 14(e). Section 14(e) is deemed to be a "gap-filler" because it is
sometimes interpreted to protect a class of plaintiffs (both corporate and indi-

vidual) which is so involved in the tender offer contest that its right to make an
investment decision based upon full disclosure by all participants in the contest
must be safeguarded.

40. 353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1972). This case was predicated specifically upon §
14(e). In Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), a

claim was predicated upon rule 10b-5. The court granted standing to the tender
offeror in Crane upon the tender offeror's lOb-5 basis for the suit. The Crane
court, in dicta, opined that the tender offeror would have had standing under
the newly enacted § 14(e) had the tender offeror asserted his claim upon § 14(e).
41. The court noted that defeat of a tender offer by false and misleading
information "is of obvious concern to the [tender] offeror's shareholders" whose
interest the plaintiff is protecting in this suit. 353 F. Supp. at 164.

42. Id.

target.43 The Portercase keenly illustrates the desire of the courts to
preserve the integrity of the cash tender offer by ensuring that the
information required to be disclosed by both parties in a tender offer
battle be fair and adequate.
The Second Circuit followed its Porter decision in Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.44 by granting standing to
appellant, the defeated tender offeror. The decision resulted in monu-

mental litigation which eventually culminated in a United States
Supreme Court decision.
THE CHRs-CRAFT LITIGATION
45
Statement of the Facts

Soon after the enactment of section 14(e), Chris-Craft Industries,
Inc. (Chris-Craft), became embroiled in a tender offer takeover
contest with Bangor Punta Corporation (BPC) for control of Piper
Aircraft Corporation (Piper). The resulting litigation 46 provided
further opportunity for judicial interpretation of section 14(e). The
Second Circuit's analysis of the causation issue is especially im47
portant.
In early 1969, Chris-Craft made a cash tender offer 48 to Piper and
its shareholders. This tender offer bound Chris-Craft to purchase the
43. Here the court noted that the shareholders of the tender offeror would be
injured if damages were not assessed against the offending target company. It
is the shareholders who must ultimately suffer if any damages are awarded. In
this context, the court referred to the encouragement in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964), for utilizing the damages remedy as "yet another enforcement mechanism of the securities laws." 353 F. Supp. at 165.
44. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973).
45. The facts summarized here are set forth in Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 349-55 (2d Cir. 1973).
46. The reported decisions, in chronological order, are Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 303 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 426 F.2d 569
(2d Cir. 1970) (preliminary injunction denied); SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331
F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), modified, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973) (BPC ordered
to offer rescission to shareholders who had accepted its tender offer), cert,
denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337
F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.) (Piper held liable in
damages), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1975) (damages award modified), cert. granted,425 U.S. 910 (1976), rev'd, Piper
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Bangor Punta Corp. v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.) (cross
action against Chris-Craft by BPC dismissed), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
47. The causation issue confronted by the Second Circuit in Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), can be simply
stated: Was Chris-Craft able to prove that the securities laws violations by the
defendants caused Chris-Craft the injury for which it sought damages?
48. The offer was for $65 per Piper share and ran from January 23 to Febru.
ary 3, 1969. Id. at 351.
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first 300,000 Piper shares tendered, with an option to purchase any
amount tendered over 300,000.19 Piper management opposed ChrisCraft's takeover attempt by sending a letter to Piper shareholders.
The letter labeled the offer as inadequate and against the best interests of Piper shareholders.5 0 Piper management then attempted to
merge with Grumman Aircraft Corporation (Grumman) by offering
to sell Piper stock to Grumman while giving Grumman an option to
return any Piper shares purchased within six months under a "put"
agreement. 51 However, the attempted merger was unsuccessful be52
cause the New York Stock Exchange refused to list the new shares.
Chris-Craft purchased 304,606 Piper shares in its cash tender offer 5 3 and then made an exchange offer5 4 to Piper and its shareholders.
In another effort to oppose acquisition by Chris-Craft, Piper management reached a merger agreement with BPC by which BPC was
bound to exchange BPC stock for all the Piper shares controlled by
Piper management (30.5% of Piper's outstanding stock). BPC then
publicly announced its intention to make an exchange offer for Piper
stock.5 In its registration statement filed with the SEC for this
exchange offer, BPC reported the Bangor and Aroostook Railroad
(BAR) as an asset worth $18,400,000. However, BPC failed to disclose
its involvement in negotiations to sell the BAR for $5,000,000.56
Shortly after the conclusion of these exchange offers, Chris-Craft
withdrew from the control contest, having acquired 40.4% of outstanding Piper stock.57 BPC later withdrew after acquiring 50.6% of
49. To make this cash tender offer, Chris-Craft had accumulated a cash fund

which consisted of $15,000,000 received on credit and $25,000,000 raised via an
offering of convertible debentures. Before the cash tender offer, Chris-Craft
had purchased 203,700 of 1,644,790 outstanding Piper shares on the market. Id.
at 350-51.

50. Id. at 364.
51. The "put" agreement gave Grumman the option to sell the shares back to

Piper after six months at Grumman's cost plus three and one-half percent
interest per annum running from the closing date. Id. at 351.
52. Id. at 352.
53. This purchase gave Chris-Craft ownership of approximately 33.8% of
outstanding Piper stock. Id. at 352.
54. The exchange offer ran from July 24 to August 4, 1969. Id. at 354.
55. While preparing this exchange offer (to run from July 18 to July 29, 1969),
BPC privately purchased Piper stock despite an earlier announcement by the
SEC that such purchases would violate SEC rule 10b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6
(1977). 480 F.2d at 354.

56. These negotiations were later consummated for a sale price of $5,000,000,
which resulted in a $13,800,000 book loss to BPC. 480 F.2d at 368.
57. Chris-Craft withdrew because it felt that BPC's lead was too great. However, BPC later urged that lack of funds was the unstated reason for ChrisCraft's withdrawal. Id. at 376.

outstanding Piper shares. Subsequently, BPC, Piper, and First Boston (BPC's stock underwriter) were held jointly and severally liable
to Chris-Craft for damages resulting from various violations of the
securities laws, especially section 14(e).58
By implying a private cause of action into the terms of section
14(e), 9 courts determine whether violations of section 14(e) are
compensable to particular plaintiffs within the confines of the
common law action for deceit. In order to establish this action, the
plaintiff must prove both reliance upon the defendant's misrepresentations and causation between the defendant's misrepresentations
and the alleged injury.6 0 However, these common law requirements
can be impractical or difficult to apply in the context of securities
regulation. These problems have resulted in the development of presumptions which tend to ease plaintiffs' burden of proof. For example, under several antifraud provisions of the securities laws, it has
become established that reliance may be presumed when the plaintiff
is able to show all other elements necessary to recover damages. 61 The
United States Supreme Court approved use of a presumption in
58. The Piper management was found liable under § 14(e) on two grounds: its
letter to Piper shareholders describing Chris-Craft's cash tender offer as "inadequate" (here the Second Circuit rejected Piper's contention that by using the
term "inadequate" it meant something other than price), id., and Piper's failure
to disclose the "put" agreement with Grumman in its press release and letter to
Piper's shareholders, id. at 352.
BPC was also found liable under § 14(e) on two grounds: its failure to disclose
the BAR negotiations which made BPC's registration statement misleading and
its private purchases of Piper stock after publicly announcing the intent to
tender an exchange offer for Piper stock, which violated SEC rule 10b-6, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1977). Id. at 369. BPC's liability under rule 10b-6 will not be
discussed except to the extent that the subsequent enactment of SEC rule lOb13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1975), directly proscribed these private purchases by
BPC, thus apparently mooting the dispute over rule 10b-6 liability.
Although First Boston's liability under § 14(e) will not be discussed, a lucid
analysis of the liability of underwriters under § 14(e) can be found in Note,
Chris-Craftand Section 14(e): The Expansion of Lead Underwriters'Liability,
42 FORDHAM L. REV. 820, 830-37 (1974).

59. See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I.
1972), aff'd, 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336

F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971). Implying a cause of action into § 14(e) is a continuation of the readiness of the courts to imply a private cause of action to suits
arising under rule 10b-5 (which was most often utilized by the courts in litigation
resulting from tender offer contests before the enactment of section 14(e)). See
generally Comment, 10b-5 Standing UnderBirnbaum:The Case of the Missing
Remedy, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1007 (1973).
60. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 105, at 685-86, 714-20 (4th ed. 1971).
61. Proof of reliance came to be presumed in class actions, which were usually employed by plaintiffs in disputes arising from stock distributions, proxy
contests, or tender offers. To require a showing of each individual's reliance
upon defendant's misrepresentations would effectively emasculate the class
action in an area where it is most useful. The reliance presumption was first
utilized by a court in a § 14(e) suit in Electronic Specialty Co. v. International
Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
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section 14(e) cases involving misrepresentations due to a failure of
62
tender offer contestants to disclose information, ostensibly upon
the theory that it would be an unreasonable burden to require the
plaintiff to show that it relied upon information which, to the plaintiff, was nonexistent.
The Mills-Affiliated Ute Presumption as Applied to Chris-Craft
The Second Circuit found that every alleged violation by BPC
caused injury to Chris-Craft. 63 The court held that any proof which
tended to establish that the violation caused a change in the outcome
of the contest would suffice to establish causation of recoverable

injury.

64

In viewing the letter to Piper shareholders and the nondisclosure of
the "put" arrangement, the court employed the Mills-Affiliated Ute
65
presumption to establish reliance by Chris-Craft. However, the
court further presumed that more Piper shares would have been
available to Chris-Craft in its cash tender offer had these violations
not occurred. This second presumption led the court to conclude that
Chris-Craft would indeed have purchased these hypothetically available shares.66 The court then found that causation had been estab67
lished due to the mathematical impact of these shares. The court,
62. The reliance presumption was recognized and approved by the Supreme
Court for use in cases arising under the securities laws antifraud provisions in
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 382 n.5 (1970), and in Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). The presumption of reliance will be referred to as the Mills-Affiliated Ute presumption.
63. The court rejected the district court's requirement that to prove causation, the plaintiff had to show that the defendant's misrepresentations caused
the defendant's control bid to succeed and that they caused the plaintiff's
control bid to fail. 480 F.2d at 373. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
64. Thus, the Second Circuit found causation of injury as to the BAR nondisclosure after concluding that it had been crucial to the ultimate success of BPC's
control bid. 480 F.2d at 375. The court also found causation as to the Piper
management's misrepresentations after deciding that they had been a factor in
the failure of Chris-Craft's control bid. Id. at 376-77.
65. It is urged that the Second Circuit's use of the Mills-Affiliated Ute presumption to establish reliance upon the Piper letter that described ChrisCraft's cash tender offer as "inadequate" was incorrect. It must be kept in mind
that the Supreme Court in Mills and Affiliated Ute distinguished an affirmative misrepresentation from a failure to disclose by presuming reliance only for
the latter. See note 59 supra.
66. 480 F.2d at 376. It is implicit in the court's reasoning that Chris-Craft's

cash tender offer would have had to be more successful had these shares been
tendered.
67. Id. at 377.

however, failed to appreciate that Chris-Craft's cash tender offer had
been a success.6 8 Even though it appeared that Chris-Craft desired
additional shares from its tender offer,6 9 Chris-Craft had not attempted to secure additional funds with which it could acquire any
shares tendered over 304,606. In fact, there was some evidence
that Chris-Craft was unable to borrow these additional funds7 0
Nevertheless, once the court arrived at these two conclusions-that
under the Mills-Affiliated Ute presumption, more Piper shares would
have been tendered absent the defendant's misrepresentation, and
that Chris-Craft could have acquired the capital it lacked to purchase these shares-it then had to address the extent to which these
additional shares would have affected the outcome of the control
contest. Unfortunately, the court never did so. Instead, it concluded
that due to BPC's narrow victory margin, the non-acquisition of
these shares caused the demise of Chris-Craft's control bid.7 '
Implicit in this conclusion is the assumption that every other event
in the control contest still would have occurred, thus enabling ChrisCraft to emerge victorious through the acquisition of these hypothetical shares. The court failed to consider that had Chris-Craft acquired these shares, BPC might have altered its strategy by committing additional funds to the contest."1
To recover for the BAR nondisclosure violation by BPC, ChrisCraft again had to prove that Piper shareholders had, in reliance
upon the nondisclosure, tendered enough shares to BPC to change the
contest's outcome. The court used the Mills-Affiliated Ute presumption to establish reliance by the Piper shareholders. 73 The court then
presumed that absolutely no Piper shareholders would have tendered
their shares to BPC had they known of the nondisclosed information.
These shares were labelled as "critical" to BPC's success because
they composed a seven percent block acquired late in the contest. 74
Again the court assumed that all other events in the contest would
have occurred exactly as before and neglected to consider whether
68. It must be remembered that under the cash tender offer, Chris-Craft was
only bound to purchase the first 300,000 Piper shares tendered to it. Chris-Craft
in fact purchased a total of 304,606 Piper shares by the conclusion of the offer.
Id. at 352.
69. Id. at 376.
70. The court rejected this evidence because it believed that Chris-Craft
could have acquired additional funds had more shares been tendered. Id.
71. Id. at 377.
72. BPC was clearly in a better financial position to acquire these shares and
to continue the contest than was Chris-Craft. If Chris-Craft had used borrowed
funds for its tender offer, the use of these funds would have constituted "a
default under certain of Chris-Craft's arrangements with its creditors." 337 F.
Supp. at 1150.
73. 480 F.2d at 375.
74. This seven percent was critical because BPC emerged with a scant 50.6%
interest. The court ruled that reliance and causation were shown. Id.
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this seven percent block of shares would have actually altered the
contest's outcome. The court could just as easily have concluded that
had BPC not acquired these shares, they would have remained on the
market for acquisition absent the BAR nondisclosure. 75 Again the
court failed to require that Chris-Craft show some causal link between defendant's violations and Chris-Craft's asserted injury. It
could be argued that BPC ceased to purchase Piper shares because it
then had control of Piper. Had it not, BPC would have continued to
purchase Piper stock for cash until it did gain control.
Thus, in discussing each violation, the court failed to limit its use of
the reliance presumption to establishing reliance in the causal chain.
presume causation, 76 the
By extending the reliance presumption 7to
7
court set a most unfortunate precedent.
CHMS-CRAFP IN THE SUPREME COURT
Piper v. Chris-CraftIndustries,Inc.78 was decided by the Supreme
Court on February 23, 1977. The Supreme Court ostensibly put to
rest what had become an extremely protracted litigation. After exam75. This alternate conclusion is perfectly reasonable, especially when viewed
in light of Chris-Craft's financial difficulties and its failure even to assert its
readiness and capability to purchase these shares. It must be remembered that
evidence was presented that BPC was able to pay for these shares with cash
reserves.
76. The Supreme Court never addressed the causation segment of the Second
Circuit's opinion. See text accompanying note 94 infra. Instead, the Court reversed on other grounds. Mr. Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, was
the only member of the Court to recognize the gravity of the Second Circuit's
causation analysis, stating that he would prefer to reverse the Second Circuit on
the causation issue rather than on the narrow ground of standing preferred by
the majority. 430 U.S. 1, 50-53 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
77. The damages holding by the Second Circuit is as controversial as its
causation analysis. The Second Circuit held the defendants jointly and severally
liable to Chris-Craft in damages amounting to $25,793,365 in Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975). However, this Comment
takes the position that due to Chris-Craft's failure to establish a causal nexus
between defendant's violations and Chris-Craft's asserted injuries, Chris-Craft
should have been foreclosed from recovering any damages by the "actual damages" limitation in § 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970).
In construing § 28, the courts have formulated several principles. First, the
damages recoverable under § 28 are specifically limited to proof that actual
damages were sustained due to the alleged securities violation. Wolf v. Frank,
477 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1973), reh. denied, 478 F.2d 1403, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975
(1974). Second, any recovery in the nature of punitive damages is prohibited.
Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
Third, no speculative damages are allowed. Gould v. American-Hawaiian. 535
F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
78. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).

ining the progress of the case through the courts, Chief Justice Bur-

ger phrased the issue rather narrowly by asking
[w]hether tender offerors such as Chris-Craft, whose activities are
regulated by the Williams Act, have a cause of action for damages
against other regulated parties under the statute on a claim that antifraud violations by other parties have frustrated
the bidder's efforts
79
to obtain control of the target corporation.

The Court employed a two-pronged approach in an effort to decide
the issue on the strict grounds of statutory interpretation. First, the
Court turned to the legislative history underlying section 14(e) to
discover the congressional purpose in enacting the section. Second,
the Court used the analysis of Cort v. Ash, 80 which delineated four
factors as being "relevant" in determining whether a private remedy
is implicit in a statute not expressly providing such a remedy.
In analyzing the legislative history of section 14(e), the Court determined that the sole purpose of the Williams Act is the protection
of investors who are confronted by a tender offer. 81 The Court found
no hint of a legislative intent to provide a private cause of action for a
losing contender against either the target corporation or a successful
offeror. 8 The Court then cited its decision in Cort as support for its
construction of the legislative history underlying section 14(e).
Under Cort, the first factor in the implication of a private cause of
action is whether the plaintiff is "one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted. '83 The Chris-Craft Court determined
that the special class under section 14(e) is exclusively made up of the
shareholders of the target corporation. Additionally, the Court interpreted the statute as a regulation of tender offerors. For both these
84
reasons, the Court decided the first factor against Chris-Craft,
79. Id. at 24.
80. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).

81. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977). As the Court stated
in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49 (1975), "the purpose of the Williams
Act is to ensure that public shareholders who are confronted by a cash tender
offer for their stock will not be required to respond without adequate information." Id. at 58. The issue in Rondeau, also very narrow, was whether the record
supported the grant of injunctive relief, a remedy the basis of which "in the
federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies." Id. at 57. In Rondeau, the issuing corporation had sued one of its shareholders who had purchased more than five percent of the outstanding corporate

stock but who failed (due to ignorance of the filing requirement) to file schedule
13D, see 17 C.F.R. §240.13d-101 (1977), with the SEC, pursuant to § 13(d) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976). The issuing corporation sought to enjoin the
shareholder from voting or pledging his stock, from acquiring additional
shares, and from divesting himself of the stock already owned. The Court
denied the issuing corporation's requests, noting that shareholders were adequately protected. 422 U.S. at 58-60.
82. 430 U.S. at 35.
83. 422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis original).
84. 430 U.S. at 36.
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The second factor under Cort is whether there is "any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy
or deny one."8 5 The Chris-CraftCourt failed to find either type of
legislative intent but concluded that because tender offerors
constituted the class the conduct of which was to be regulated by the
statute, there was no reason to believe that Congress intended to
grant them the weapon of a private cause of action for damages.86
Under Cort, the third factor in the implication of a private cause of
action is whether "it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff. '87 In
Chris-Craft,the Court concluded that it was not, stating that "as a
disclosure mechanism aimed especially at protecting the shareholders of target corporations, the Williams Act cannot consistently be
interpreted as conferring a monetary remedy upon regulated parties,
particularly where the award would not redound to the direct benefit
of the protected class." 8 The Court stressed that Chris-Craft had not
sued in its capacity as an89injured Piper shareholder but had sued as a
defeated tender offeror.
The fourth factor under Cort is whether "the cause of action is one
traditionally relegated to state law."9 0 In this regard, the Chris-Craft
Court emphasized dicta by the Second Circuit that the plaintiff had a
possible cause of action under the common law principles of interference with a prospective commercial advantage." The Court reasoned, therefore, that it would be entirely appropriate to limit the
plaintiff, when suing in its capacity as a defeated tender offeror, to
92
its remedy provided by state law.
Piperv. Chris-CraftIndustries,Inc. was limited to a narrow holding: A tender offeror, when suing in its capacity as a takeover bidder,
93
does not have standing to sue for damages under the Williams Act.
By disposing of the case in this manner, the Court effectively avoided
9 4
addressing the other issues presented and argued by the parties.
85. 422 U.S. at 78.
86. 430 U.S. at 36-37.
87. 422 U.S. at 78.
88. 430 U.S. at 39.
89. Id. This statement implies that had Chris-Craft asserted injury to itself in
another capacity, it might have altered the Court's conclusion.
90. 422 U.S. at 78.
91. 430 U.S. at 40-41.

92. Id.
93. Id. at 42 n.28.

94. Among the other issues presented in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. were

CRITICISM OF THE SUPREME CoURT's ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court's Statutory Construction
After a cursory analysis of the Williams Act, the Court concluded
that no private right of action under section 14(e) exists for defeated
tender offerors. 95 Having reached this decision, the Court then analyzed the legislative history of the Williams Act in an attempt to find
some substantiation for its holding. The Court was guided in this
search by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who had stated that the Court
"must be wary against interpolating our notions of justice in the
interstices of legislative provisions." 96 In addition, the Court noted
that it was not bound to accept statements made by those who were
not directly responsible for the sponsorship of the statute in question. 97 With these two principles in mind, the Court embarked upon a
selective analysis of the legislative history behind the Williams Act.
Remarks made by Senator Williams, the sponsor of the Act, were
stressed by the Court in its search for the congressional purpose
underlying the. Act. 98 Senator Williams was sensitive to the plight of
the shareholder who needs the protection of accurate and truthful
information.99 The Court quoted 10 Senator Williams to the effect
that "S.510 is designed solely to require full and fair disclosure for
the benefit of investors."'' 1 However, Senator Williams had in fact
stated that the purpose of the bill was "to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of shareholders while at the same time providing
the offeror and management equal opportunityto fairlypresent their
case."10 2 From this statement, it is evident that Senator Williams
intended to maintain the integrity of the tender offer by requiring
honest and accurate disclosure of information. Furthermore, Senator
Williams expressed his hope that the disclosure requirements of the
federal securities laws would aid, not hinder, legitimate business
ventures. Senator Williams stated:
scienter, causation, calculation of damages, imposition of joint and several
liability, liability of underwriters in § 14(e) damages actions, and award of prejudgment interest. Unfortunately, by so deciding the case, the Court allowed the
rather dubious Second Circuit holdings on causation and damages to stand,
thus giving them some value as precedent.
95. 430 U.S. at 47.
96. Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942).
97. During its previous term, the Court had stated that "[r]emarks of this kind
made in the course of legislative debate or hearings other than by persons
responsible for the preparation or the drafting of a bill are entitled to little
weight." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204 n.24 (1976).
98. 430 U.S. at 26-27, 31.
99. 113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
100. 430 U.S. at 31.
101. 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
102. Id. (emphasis added).
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While the bill may discourage tender offers or other attempts to acquire control by those who are unwilling to expose themselves to the
light of disclosure, this is but a small price to pay for adequate investor protection. Experience under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has amply demonstrated that the
disclosure requirements of the Federal Securities1 3Acts are an aid to
legitimate business transactions, not a hindance.'
These remarks by the sponsor hardly support the Court's assertion
that the sole purpose of the Act is protection of the shareholder who
10 4
is confronted by a tender offer.
Remarks by Senator Kuchel, 10 5 who voiced a concern for "corporate raiders" and "takeover pirates," were used by the Court as
evidence that tender offerors were to be regulated by the Act, not to
become beneficiaries of its disclosure provisions. 10 6 The Court's reliance upon these statements by Senator Kuchel is a questionable
because these remarks were
exercise in statutory interpretation'
made in 1965-before Senate hearings on the initial proposal by
Senator Williams took place. These statements do not accurately
reflect the congressional purpose underlying the Williams Act as
finally enacted in 1968.
The Court rejected Chris-Craft's attempt to use statements by
expert witnesses Professors Israels and Painter to show that
Congress was aware that private actions were implicit in section
14(e). 10 8 However, in virtually the same paragraph, the Court relied

upon remarks presented by other expert witnesses during congressional hearings on the bill.10 9 These remarks were cited as confirming
the Court's belief that what Congress had in mind was the protection
of investors, the "pawns in a form of industrial warfare." 110 As
further confirmation of its belief that tender offerors did not have
103. Id.
104. 430 U.S. at 35. These statements also would appear to cloud the perceptiveness of the dicta in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49 (1975), used by
the Court to the same effect.
105. Senator Kuchel was co-sponsor of the Williams Act.
106. 430 U.S. at 28.
107. Considering the genesis of the Williams Act, as presented in the beginning of this Comment, it is apparent that Senator Williams was originally
concerned with corporate pirates in his initial presentation of the Act in 1965.
See notes 18-24 and accompanying text supra.However, he was also persuaded
that tender offers may serve some very useful functions. This belief is found in
his subsequent presentation of the Act which, as enacted, omitted all reference
to and concern for corporate raiders and takeover pirates.
108. The Court dismissed these statements and similar materials as being of
limited value. 430 U.S. at 31 n.20.
109. Id. at 29, 33-34.
110. Id. at 27.

standing to sue under section 14(e), the Court quoted another expert
witness who believed that "the two major protagonists-the bidder
and the defending management-do not need additional protection.""' Chief Justice Burger apparently did not feel constrained by
the same principles of statutory interpretation which he so forcefully
thrust upon the plaintiffs. The Court's approach effectively emasculates the very principles enunciated by the Court as controlling its
disposition of the case.
Analysis of Cort v. Ash
The Court utilized the analysis in Cort v. Ash" 2 to confirm that its
interpretation of section 14(e)'s legislative history was correct. As
noted previously, Cort identified four factors as "relevant" in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly
providing one. 1 3 The Court concluded that these criteria militated
against implying a private cause of action in favor of Chris-Craft
when suing in its capacity as a defeated tender offeror. 114
However, the Cort test can just as effectively show that Congress
intended an implied private cause of action in favor of defeated
tender offerors under section 14(e). The first factor under Cort is
whether plaintiff is "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted. 1 5 As previously shown, those statements in the
legislative record which were so carefully severed from the statements quoted by the Court afford ample evidence that defeated
tender offerors are within this class." 8
The second factor is whether there is "any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or deny
one.""' 7 Again, in omitted portions of statements in the legislative
record, this intention is explicitly voiced by the sponsor of the Williams Act. 1 8 Implicitly, there is a "pervasive legislative scheme governing the relationship between the plaintiff class and the defendant
119
class in a particular regard."
The third factor in the implication of a private cause of action
under Cort is whether it is "consistent with the underlying purposes
111. Id. at 29. Mr. Hayes continued by noting that "the investor-who is the
subject of these entreaties of both major protagonists-is the one who needs a
more effective champion." Id.
112. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).

113. Id. at 80-85.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See notes 83-92 and accompanying text supra.
See text accompanying note 83 supra.
See text accompanying notes 100-103 supra.
422 U.S. at 78.
See text accompanying notes 100-103 supra.
422 U.S. at 82.
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120
of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff.'
Senator Williams was particularly concerned that the Act might be
used to favor one side or the other in control contests.' 2 ' By determining the third factor against Chris-Craft, the Court effectively negated
the Senator's desire for neutrality. When blatant violations of the
securities laws are perpetrated by the target company's management
and by the competing tender offeror, the Court's refusal to allow an
action by an innocent tender offeror is indeed "tipping the scales...
in favor of management or in favor of the persons making the takeover bid."' 122 Such an approach undermines the integrity of the tender offer as a mechanism of corporate acquisition.

The fourth factor in Cort is whether "the cause of action is one
traditionally relegated to state law."' 121 When the violations in ChrisCraft occurred (1969), scant state law regulating tender offers existed. 24 It can hardly be concluded that this particular cause of action
was one traditionallyrelegated to state law. The Court neatly sidestepped this conclusion by determining that the common law provides an adequate cause of action for the injury asserted by Chris125
Craft.
In refusing to imply a cause of action in favor of Chris-Craft, the
Court ignored judicial precedent that had expressly implied a private
12
cause of action under section 14(e) in favor of several parties
120. Id. at 78.
121. "We have taken extreme care to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of
management or in favor of the persons making the takeover bid." 113 CONG.
REC. 24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
122. Id. In this context, the "management" is Piper management and the
"persons making the takeover bid" are BPC.
123. 422 U.S. at 78.
124. Prior to 1969, no statutory regulation of cash tender offers existed at the
state level. Even the common law responsibilities of the directors of the offeror
and offeree corporations were unsettled. Kennedy, Tender Moment, 23 Bus.
LAW. 1091, 1094 (1968). State concern for preserving the integrity of the takeover
mechanism through fair and adequate disclosure first developed in 1968. See,
e.g., VA. CODE §§ 13.113.540 (Supp. 1968); 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) §§ 49,22849,241 (1968). Another state considering similar legislation was Pennsylvania
(legislation eventually codified in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 459.6 (Purdon Supp.
1970)). British Commonwealth legislation was cited by Congress as illustrating
the need for federal action. 111 CONG. REC. 28259 (1965) (statement of Sen.
Williams). Foreign tender offer legislation is discussed in Fleischer & Mundheim, CorporateAcquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 323, 32627 (1967).
125. Pennsylvania, Piper's state of incorporation, evidently did not share the
Court's conclusion as to the adequacy of the common law cause of action, as it
subsequently enacted tender offer legislation in 1970. See note 124 supra.
126. See notes 25-40 and accompanying text supra.

concerned with the tender offer battle. The Court also ignored the
analogous precedent it had set in implying a private cause of action
under rule IOb-5. For example, in Blue Chip Stamps v. ManorDrug
Stores,127 the defendant contended that it was improper to imply a
private cause of action under rule 10b-5.128 Admitting the lack of an
express grant of standing in rule 10b-5, the Court rejected the
contention that it was improper to imply a private cause of action:
"We are dealing with a private cause of action which has judicially
been found to exist, and which will have to be judicially delimited
one way or another unless and until Congress addresses the question."' 29 Unfortunately the Court in Chris-Craftnever distinguishes
its willingness to imply a private cause of action under rule 10b-5
from its reluctance to imply a private cause of action under the
provisions of section 14(e). Section 14(e) and rule 10b-5 are both
antifraud provisions in the law of securities regulation, and both
have judicial precedent implying a private cause of action from their
express statutory provisions.
It should now be clear that the test enunciated in Cort is hardly the
talisman of statutory construction the Court determined it to be. The
Court's use of Cort as precedent in Chris-Craftis inappropriate for
several reasons. Primarily, Cort was factually different from ChrisCraft: Cort involved a suit by a shareholder against corporate management for the recovery of corporate funds expended by management for political advertisements in the 1972 presidential campaign.
These expenditures violated a criminal statute that proscribed any
contribution or expenditure in connection with any vice-presidential
or presidential election. 3 0 The congressional policy underlying the
criminal statute was to free vice-presidential and presidential elections from corporate influence. This policy is hardly the same as the
congressional policy underlying section 14(e). Second, the issue in
Cort was whether the statute created an implied private remedy
which could be invoked by a shareholder when suing corporate management in derivative cause of action. To the contrary, the issue
presented in Chris-Craft was who may invoke a remedy that has
already been implied by the courts. Third, Cort involved interpretation of a criminal statute which provided for criminal penalties such
as imprisonment and fines. Chris-Craft,however, involved interpretation of a statute under which only a civil cause of action had been
implied. Civil damages were the only remedy available to the plaintiff suing under section 14(e). Finally, the statute in Cort did not
127. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
128. Id. at 749.
129. Id.
130. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970).
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allow for civil enforcement of its provisions, whereas the threat
of civil enforcement is a primary method of preventing violations
under section 14(e).
Cort, therefore, was not an appropriate precedent for Chris-Craft.
The controversies presented in the Chris-Craftlitigation could have
been more properly determined under the principles set forth in the
landmark decision of J.I. Case Co. v. Borak.1 1 Borak, however, is
factually similar to Chris-Craft.Borak involved a derivative action
brought by a shareholder who had received and then acted upon
misleading proxy statements. The Court in Chris-Craftintimated on
several occasions that had Chris-Craft sued derivatively as a Piper
shareholder, the Court might have granted standing.'3 2 In addition,
the issue in Borak was the same as that presented in Chris-Craft:
who may sue under an antifraud provision of the 1934 Act which
makes no specific reference to a private right of action. Finally,
Borak involved statutory construction of section 14(a)-another
antifraud provision of the 1934 Act primarily enforced by civil
actions.
In Borak, the Court was confronted with an antifraud provision
which, like section 14(e), was devoid of any provisions creating a
private cause of action. The Court determined that where congressional purposes are likely to be undermined in the absence of private
enforcement, private remedies may be implied in favor of the class
Indeed, the Court carefully
intended to benefit from the statute.'
noted in Borak that because of practical limitations upon the SEC's
enforcement capabilities, "private enforcement of the proxy rules
34
provides necessary supplement to Commission action."'
In Borak, the Court concluded that a derivative suit on behalf of
the corporation could be brought under section 14(a) 135 even though
131. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).

132. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
133. 377 U.S. at 432.
134. Id. It is noteworthy that the Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), specifically alluded to this language in Borak
concerning the necessity for supplemental private remedies without which
congressional protection of shareholders would be defeated. Id. at 730. This
rationale is also applicable to Chris-Craft.The United States implied as much
when it stated that "the SEC has limited resources and may not be able to
monitor every corporate takeover bid. Accordingly, lawsuits by injured tender
offerors provide a. . . supplement to commission action... necessary to make
effective the Congressional purpose." Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 15, Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
135. 430 U.S. at 66.

it seemed clear that the primary beneficiaries of this section were
individual shareholders rather than corporations. 3 6 Therefore,
Borak itself does not meet the "especial" class test of Cort. Chief
Justice Burger stated that Borak did meet this test because the
damages did not arise from deceiving the individual shareholders but
rather from deception practiced on the shareholders as a group in
their capacity as owners of the corporation. Therefore, shareholders
as a class composed the "especial" class for which section 14(a) was
enacted." 7 Even under this rationale, it is difficult to understand the
distinction drawn by the Chris-CraftCourt that only ordinary shareholders, as opposed to holders of larger blocks, are protected by
section 14(e).
Perhaps the most cogent argument favoring Borak as precedent for
Chris-Craftcan be found in Cort itself when the Court distinguished
Borak on grounds that apply to Chris-Craft.In Chris-Craft,as in
Borak, there is "at least a statutory basis for inferring that a cause of
action lay in favor of someone." 1 8 There is a "pervasive legislative
scheme governing the relationship between the plaintiff class and the
defendant class in a particular regard.' 1 39 The private remedy is
necessary to effectuate the Congressional goal. 40 This goal would
accordingly be hindered if the plaintiff were relegated to an inadequate state remedy.' 4 ' In the circumstances peculiar to Chris-Craft
and to Borak, Cort does not require that the plaintiff belong to an
"especial" class. At no time does Cort state that this factor is essential. In addition, Cort further distinguishes Borak by suggesting the
presence of a "pervasive legislative scheme" as an alternative to an
"articulated federal right in the plaintiff."' 4 2
In denying standing to Chris-Craft under section 14(e), the Court
rather summarily rejected several important arguments that were
presented in favor of according Chris-Craft standing. The most important argument was that by granting a tender offeror standing to
sue, the shareholders in general would have received significant
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

377 U.S. at 432.
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 32 n.21 (1977).
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79 (1975).
Id. at 82.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 85.

142. Mr. Justice Stevens, in his Chris-Craft dissent (joined by Mr. Justice
Brennan), believed that this was a vital argument favoring Borak over Cort as
precedent. To this argument, the Court stated that the shareholders would not
benefit because any judgment rendered against the competing tender offeror
would invariably injure its stockholders. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430
U.S. at 39. Thus, in effect, the Court preferred that shareholders of the defeated
tender offeror, which was innocent of any violation of the securities laws,
should suffer devaluation of their stock instead of the shareholders of the
victorious offeror which was in violation of federal securities laws.
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additional protection, 143 primarily because the participants in the
tender offer contest have an interest in preserving the integrity of the
process.14 4 It has been noted that an offeror's economic stake in the
outcome of the control battle, the offeror's resources, and the possibility of an extraordinarily large recovery provide the offeror with
the incentive and the capacity to detect violations and to pursue
remedies vigorously. 1 45 In addition, private rights of action under the
federal securities laws stimulate compliance with these laws and
serve as a necessary supplement to SEC enforcement action. 146 As
one of the draftsmen of the 1934 Act stated in advocating liberal
standing requirements under the Act, "there is no policeman so
pocketbook is affected by the degree to
effective as the one whose '1
4
which he enforced the law. 7
The Court in Chris-Craftattempted to respond to the theory pervading these statements by urging that if indeed there were violations encountered in a tender offer battle for control, the individual
shareholder could best fend for himself using private damages actions. "48
' This belief is theoretically attractive but, from a practical
143. The Court dismissed this argument by stating that it would instead
injure shareholders in two ways: first, by discouraging their corporations from
competing in tender offer battles for fear of being subjected to suits by defeated
tender offerors "for what courts subsequently hold to be an actionable violation
of § 14(e)"; and second, by causing the victor to bear expenses of litigation by
defeated tender offerors in a later and successful defense of its victory. Id. at
40. The second argument was presented by Mr. Justice Stevens, who urged that
he was "unpersuaded that the federal courts are incapable of structuring the
remedy to avoid this problem." Id. See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File
Co., 482 F.2d 421, 425 (1st Cir. 1973). Indeed, the Court has previously rejected
the very argument which it now asserts: that expanding standing of an antifraud securities law provision would result in vexatious suits. In Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Court stated:
Congress itself recognized the potential for nuisance or "strike" suits in
this type of litigation, and in Title II of the 1934 Act amended § 11 of the
1933 Act to provide that "In any suit under this or any other section of
this title the Court may, within its discretion, require an undertaking for
the payment of the costs of such suit, including reasonable attorney's
fees. . ." Sen. Fletcher, Chairman of the Senate Banking and Finance
Committee, in introducing Title II of the 1934 Act on the Senate floor,
stated in explaining the amendment to § 11(e): "This amendment is the
most important of all." Among its purposes is to provide "a defense
against blackmail suits."
Id. at 740-41 (citations omitted).
144. Such a concern was expressed by Senator Williams. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
145. H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 424 (1st Cir. 1973).
146. Id. See also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
147. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 62 n.14 (1977).
148. Id. at 40.

view, most unrealistic. To conclude that the threat of a private suit by
an individual shareholder provides any incentive to a tender offeror
to conduct his battle within legal bounds is being overly optimistic.
Indeed, few shareholders have the capacity to pursue such violations
effectively.'49 Therefore, the most realistic deterrent to antifraud
violations is a suit properly brought by the competing tender offeror
which has the resources available and the financial investment at
stake' 50 to police diligently violations by its competitor. A potential
consequence of the Chris-CraftCourt's reasoning in this regard is the
encouragement of violations of the Williams Act in the context of a
tender offer battle. Suit by individual shareholders is not an effective deterrent, and as previously noted, the SEC lacks the means to
police and to prosecute adequately each violation.' 5'
Chris-Craft might have been accorded standing in this case had it
been more careful in phrasing the capacity in which it sought damages for defendant's violations. Indeed, had it asserted injury in its
capacity as an injured Piper shareholder rather than in its capacity
as a defeated tender offeror, Chris-Craft might have been granted
standing under the Court's determination that the underlying policy
of the 2Williams Act is to protect shareholders of the target com15
pany.
CONCLUSION

By refusing to accord Chris-Craft standing to sue for violations of
section 14(e), the Supreme Court effectively undermined the congressional purposes underlying the enactment of section 14(e). Apparently, the Court is satisfied that the securities laws can be vigorously
enforced by the SEC and by individual shareholders. However, the
SEC cannot detect and prosecute every violation of the securities
laws. Indeed, the Court itself noted that the SEC decided not to
pursue actions by BPC which subsequently were pursued by ChrisCraft. 153 In addition, it has been shown that the reliance placed by
the Court upon the ability of the individual shareholder to detect and
149. How many individual shareholders would have the resources available
to pursue violations through intricate litigation involving a preliminary injunction, discovery, trial on liability, another trial on damages, three appeals (one en
banc) to the Second Circuit, two petitions to and one argument before the
Supreme Court? In other words, how many shareholders could pursue the
extensive litigation found in Chris-Craft?
150. Chris-Craft had invested nearly $44,000,000 in its effort to acquire Piper.
480 F.2d at 354.
151. See note 134 and accompanying text supra.
152. The Court suggests as much on several points. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
153. 430 U.S. at 8. These actions were found to be violations of rule 10b-6 by
,the Second Circuit in Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d
341, 392 (2d Cir. 1973).
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to prosecute violations in a tender offer battle is seriously mistaken
from a practical point of view. The Court is content to expect the
virtually non-existent threat of suit by individual shareholders to be
an effective deterrent to violations of section 14(e). In effect, the
Court is encouraging contestants in a tender offer contest to manipulate the securities laws to enhance their prospects of gaining control.
It is difficult to understand how such conduct will redound to the
benefit of the individual shareholder. The Court's concern with protecting the individual shareholder seems somewhat superficial when
viewed in this light.
Indeed, it is very doubtful that the Court would deny standing to a
defeated tender offeror who could, unlike Chris-Craft, prove that
violations by the successful tender offeror caused the demise of the
defeated tender offeror's bid for control. In rendering the blanket
holding that no tender offerors have standing to sue under section
14(e), the Court denies standing even to those tender offerors who can
link the defendant's violations with their defeat. It is hoped that the
decision in Chris-Craftwill be subsequently limited to its facts, thus
limiting its value as precedent. If Chris-Craft is not so limited it will
be the individual shareholder who will have to pay the price of the
artful games of deception and sleight of hand which will surely be
employed by contestants in the heat of a tender offer battle. The
control contest could deteriorate into a battle of skilled retaliation
between tender offerors.
The desire of the Court to dispose of Chris-Craftthrough statutory
interpretation is inexplicable. The Court's reading of the legislative
history underlying section 14(e) is inconsistent at best and resultoriented at worst. The Court's selection of Cort as the controlling
precedent for Chris-Craftis puzzling because Cort and Chris-Craft
have virtually nothing in common.
The Court's holding in Chris-Craftviolates the congressional mandate that
the bill [avoid] tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of
management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. It is
designed to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors
while at the same time providing the offeror and management equal
opportunity to fairly present their case.1M

The Chris-Craftruling does not maintain the integrity of the tender
154. 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams). Thus, the argument that the Court actually aided one of the contestants in this tender
offer battle can reasonably be asserted.

offer as a mechanism of corporate acquisition because it fails to
ensure fair and adequate disclosure of the information which was
determined by Congress to be the subject of disclosure requirements
in takeover attempts.
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